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Abstract 
This paper proposes foundations and a methodology for survey-based tracking of well-being. First, we 
develop a theory in which utility depends on “fundamental aspects” of well-being, measurable with 
surveys. Second, drawing from psychologists, philosophers, and economists, we compile a 
comprehensive list of such aspects. Third, we demonstrate our proposed method for estimating the 
aspects’ relative marginal utilities—a necessary input for constructing an individual-level well-being 
index—by asking ~4,600 U.S. survey respondents to state their preference between pairs of aspect 
bundles. We estimate high relative marginal utilities for aspects related to family, health, security, values, 
freedom, happiness, and life satisfaction. 
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The cornerstone of neoclassical welfare economics is the principle of revealed 
preference, according to which the ultimate criterion for judging what makes a person better off 
is what she chooses, in a situation in which she is well-informed about the consequences of her 
options. Yet for most policy decisions, a government cannot directly infer an individual’s 
welfare from her choices over policies because individuals rarely make such choices.1 Hence in 
practice economists often rely on revealed preference indirectly, evaluating policy options by 
how they affect indicators—most prominently, GDP—that can be viewed as summarizing, under 
some assumptions, a set of generally-desired outcomes. But because GDP and other available 
indicators have known limitations as well-being measures, economists have been seeking 
additional indicators that go “beyond GDP” (for a recent survey, see Fleurbaey, 2009). In this 
paper, we focus on developing one such indicator: an individual-level index that combines 
together different aspects of well-being that may be measured by survey questions. 
As candidate measures of individuals’ well-being, economists and psychologists have 
recently been investigating survey measures of “subjective well-being” (SWB); while we use this 
term to refer to any subjective assessment of some aspect of well-being, economists have 
primarily focused on questions about one’s own happiness or life satisfaction. Because responses 
to such questions reflect a wide range of experiences, including those unrelated to market 
exchange (Diener and Seligman, 2004; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006), many researchers have 
advocated conducting nation-wide SWB surveys and using the responses to calculate indicators 
alongside GDP-like measures (e.g., Diener, 2000; Diener, 2006, signed by 50 researchers; 
Layard, 2005; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009). 
Although these proposals are controversial among economists, policymakers have begun 
to embrace them. For example, starting in April 2011, the U.K. Office of National Statistics 
began including the following SWB questions in its Integrated Household Survey, a survey that 
reaches 200,000 adults annually (ONS, 2011): 
  
Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays? 
Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday? 
																																																													
1 Holding a referendum on every issue would incur prohibitively high transaction costs. Moreover, for 
many issues, even a direct vote would not reveal preferences because voters lack full information about—
and might systematically mispredict—the consequences of alternative policy options (see Gilbert, 2006, 
for evidence on systematic misprediction of happiness).  
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Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday? 
Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile? 
 
According to Prime Minister David Cameron, “it’s time we focused not just on GDP but on 
GWB—general wellbeing.”2 Other governments around the world have expressed similar 
intentions to field SWB surveys and use the responses to guide policy.3 
 Notwithstanding this recent enthusiasm, there are many open questions regarding the 
endeavor of tracking well-being with surveys. Among the most urgent practical questions are the 
following two. First, which SWB questions should governments ask? It is increasingly 
recognized that more than one question is likely to be needed because SWB is multi-dimensional 
(e.g., Ryff, 1989; Kahneman and Deaton, 2010) and because widely-used SWB measures may 
not capture all factors that enter into preferences (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Rees-Jones, 
2012, 2013). Current proposals for survey questions, however, rely on different experts’ own 
readings of the SWB literature rather than on a systematic method.4 Second, how should 
responses to different questions be weighted relative to each other? Current proposals are 
virtually silent on relative weighting (in some cases purposefully so). But in practice, due to an 
apparently inevitable demand for summary indicators, ad hoc weights often end up being applied 
implicitly by users or explicitly in published indices (Micklewright, 2001). 
This paper has two overarching purposes. First, we propose a framework, grounded in a 
preference-based theory, for conceptualizing and discussing survey-based measurement of well-
being. Second, we demonstrate a disciplined approach, anchored in revealed preference—albeit 
based on hypothetical choices—to applying our framework to the development of well-being 
surveys and indices. We emphasize that relative to the many decades of theoretical and practical 
																																																													
2 “David Cameron aims to make happiness the new GDP.” The Guardian, November 14, 2010.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/14/david-cameron-wellbeing-inquiry as accessed on May 
13, 2011. 
3 For example, in December 2011, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on National 
Statistics convened the first in a series of meetings of a “Panel on Measuring Subjective Well-Being in a 
Policy Relevant Framework.” As part of its Better Life Initiative, the OECD has held several conferences 
on “Measuring Well-Being for Development and Policy Making” since May, 2011; the organization’s 
Better Life Index website (www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org) invites visitors to rate thirty-six countries by 
interactively creating indices from eleven dimensions of well-being that include SWB. Moreover, this 
interest is not limited to rich, Western countries; indeed, Bhutan is considered the pioneer of Gross 
National Happiness, a concept conceived there in the 1970s. 
4 For prominent—and conflicting—proposals to the U.K. Office of National Statistics, see Dolan, Layard, 
and Metcalfe (2011) and Deaton, Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone (2011). 
4	
	
work that underlies the present well-developed state of measures such as GDP, efforts to 
construct and apply survey-based well-being indicators are still in their infancy. Hence, we view 
this paper as primarily methodological, proposing an agenda for a new approach, and we view 
our specific contributions as first steps to be improved upon by future work. 
In section I, we present our theoretical framework. We assume that utility u(w) depends 
on a vector w of fundamental aspects of well-being, for example those that can be measured with 
survey questions similar to the four above. Any vector proportional to the vector of marginal 
utilities Dwu(w) can then be used as relative weights for combining the components of w into an 
individual-level index that tracks small changes in well-being. For large changes in the aspects, 
the index can still be used to track changes in well-being but only provides a partial welfare 
ordering. While we do not make novel contributions regarding how to aggregate well-being 
indices across individuals, our framework could be used in conjunction with existing approaches 
to aggregation.  
In section II, we describe our attempt to identify the major components of w. We compile 
a list—of 136 aspects of well-being—aimed at including all the main factors that have been 
proposed as important components of well-being in a sample of major works in philosophy, 
psychology, and economics, from Maslow (1946) to Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009) and 
beyond. The list includes aspects that have been considered as fundamental, as well as broader, 
“combination aspects” that may single-handedly capture many fundamental aspects. While it 
includes SWB measures widely used by economists (e.g., happiness and life satisfaction), it also 
includes other items, such as goals and achievements, freedoms, engagement, morality, self-
expression, relationships, and the well-being of others. While far from exhaustive, our list 
represents, as far as we know, the most comprehensive effort to date to construct such a 
compilation (cf., Alkire, 2002). 
Next, as described in section III, we design and conduct a survey to estimate a vector 
proportional to the vector of marginal utilities Dwu(w). We present more than 4,600 Internet 
survey respondents—a demographically diverse (albeit not representative) sample of the U.S. 
adult population—with sets of hypothetical-choice scenarios. We first provide detailed scenario 
instructions and an example. Then, in each scenario we elicit respondents’ stated preference 
between two options that differ only on how they rate on a small set of aspects. For example: 
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In our estimation procedures, the dependent variable is the response to the choice question 
above, and the independent variables are the relative ratings of the aspects (the “X”s) in the table 
above. Because we randomly assign which aspects vary between the options and by how much, 
we can identify the relative marginal utility of each aspect. We call this stated-preference survey 
for estimating relative marginal utilities a SP survey to distinguish it from a SWB survey that 
would measure individuals’ levels of aspects of well-being.5 We highlight differences between 
our specific SP-survey implementation and the theoretical ideal that we anticipate governments 
could approximate more closely. 
Section IV presents our main survey findings. Using personal-choice scenarios similar to 
the one above and pooling across all of our respondents we find, among other things, that while 
commonly-measured aspects of well-being such as happiness, life satisfaction, and health are 
																																																													
5 Broadly speaking, our SP survey can be viewed as an application of conjoint analysis (Green and Rao, 
1971). In the context of assessing welfare, our survey design is closely related to the method proposed in 
Adler and Dolan (2008), who argue that policymakers’ weighting of different aspects of well-being 
should be informed by how survey respondents rank alternative “lives” that vary in the aspects. They 
illustrate their method with an exploratory study of 72 undergraduate respondents and four aspects: 
income, health, happiness, and life expectancy. Relatedly, Adler (2012) proposes a conceptual framework 
similar to ours, viewing w as a hybrid of “mental” (e.g., emotions) and “non-mental” (e.g., freedoms) 
aspects. He encourages using stated-preference surveys for learning about u(w). 
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indeed among those with the largest relative marginal utilities, other aspects that are measured 
less commonly have relative marginal utilities that are at least as large. These include aspects 
related to family (well-being, happiness, and relationship quality), security (financial, physical, 
and with regard to life and the future in general), values (morality and meaning), and having 
options (freedom of choice, and resources). Using policy-choice scenarios, in which respondents 
vote between two policies that differ in how they affect aspects of well-being for everyone in the 
nation, we continue to find the patterns above and in addition find high relative marginal utilities 
for aspects related to political rights, morality of others, and compassion toward others, in 
particular the poor and others who struggle. While we find some differences across 
demographic-group and political-orientation subpopulations of our respondents, most of these 
main results hold across the subpopulations we examine.  
We present a long list of robustness checks in section V. These include exploring the 
sensitivity of our findings to: estimating alternative econometric specifications; excluding 
alternative candidates for (non-fundamental) combination aspects from the estimation; 
examining subsets of our respondents based on the time they took to complete the survey; and 
varying survey design elements that we randomly manipulated. 
In section VI we return to the two practical questions above—which items to include on a 
SWB survey, and how to weight them to construct an index—and discuss potential solutions, 
both in theory and in practice. We outline directions for thinking about implementation 
challenges such as avoiding double counting and reducing the number of survey questions. 
Our paper contributes to a long line of research on social welfare measures, recently 
surveyed by Fleurbaey (2009) and Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013).6 Our approach has the 
appealing feature that it accommodates several traditions that are often considered conflicting. It 
is, at the same time, “super-liberal” (Fleurbaey, 2009) since we weight aspects based solely on 
our respondents’ stated preferences; “welfarist” (Sen, 1979a) since utility can be viewed as our 
exclusive criterion for judging well-being;7 and an application of Sen’s (1985, 1992) 
																																																													
6 Fleurbaey’s (2009) title, “Beyond GDP: The Quest for a Measure of Social Welfare,” inspired the title 
of our paper. 
7 Sen (1979a) defines welfarism as the imposition of the following “informational constraint”: “[t]he 
judgment of the relative goodness of alternative states of affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken 
as an increasing function of, the respective collections of individual utilities in these states.” Sen criticizes 
this notion and argues that information beyond individual utilities may be needed for making moral 
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“capabilities” approach since the vector w can be considered to include both functionings 
(achieved states, e.g., material standard of living, health) and capabilities (opportunities for such 
achievements, e.g., freedoms).8 Indeed, as described above, we find that our respondents put a 
large weight on capabilities, especially in policy scenarios.9 
 The central assumption underlying our SP-survey methodology is that a person’s stated 
preference in our abstract scenarios is an unbiased measure of her (“true”) preference.10 This 
assumption is surely wrong; indeed, there are known ways in which stated preference is biased 
relative to incentivized choice, for example when one choice option is viewed as more socially 
desirable (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Ding, Grewal, and Liechty, 2005). Nonetheless, we 
believe it is more attractive to rely on what people’s own stated preferences suggest about what 
they themselves care about than to paternalistically rely on the opinions and introspections of 
“experts” (such as researchers and policymakers) regarding which aspects to track and how to 
weight them. Moreover, some of the objections to using stated preferences as if they are 
descriptive of incentivized choice may have less force when stated preferences are used 
normatively. In particular, while hypothetical choices in abstract scenarios may elicit meta-
preferences (the preferences people want themselves to have), rationalized preferences (more 
deliberated, internally consistent preferences), or otherwise laundered preferences (e.g., omitting 
“dirty” preferences such as racism), it is sometimes argued that these are more relevant for 
evaluating welfare than the preferences that describe actual behavior. For example, our SP 
survey may put respondents in a deliberative frame of mind, causing them to weight emotional 
																																																																																																																																																																																																				
judgments. To partially address this concern, our approach attempts to include important specific 
examples of such information as additional arguments in the utility function (i.e., as elements of w). 
8 From the capabilities-approach perspective, our empirical effort is an attempt to address the “index 
problem,” namely the problem of choosing weights for functionings and capabilities. This problem has 
been considered a key obstacle to systematically applying the capabilities approach (Fleurbaey, 2009) and 
is in general central to the construction of multi-dimensional well-being indices (Decancq and Lugo, 
2013). Although Sen initially opposed combining measures of capabilities and functionings into an index, 
he later seems to have become more sympathetic (Micklewright, 2001).  
9 This also gives some support to Rawls’s (1971) contention that most people would prioritize basic rights 
ahead of other goods. 
10 While we interpret our results in light of this assumption, we believe that our empirical contribution can 
be useful also in the context of alternative theoretical perspectives, such as that of Fleurbaey, Schokkaert, 
and Decancq (2009), who single out a specific survey question—a life satisfaction question—and propose 
to use it as the primary source of information about preferences, and those explored by Decancq, Van 
Ootegem, and Verhofstadt (2011), who pre-select nine survey questions and evaluate alternative 
weighting schemes by directly asking survey respondents how important they consider each of the nine to 
be. In particular, our approach can inform researchers regarding the link between different survey 
questions and stated preferences.  
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factors less than they do in “real life”—but doing exactly that is common prescriptive advice for 
avoiding emotion-induced mistakes (e.g., Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and 
Rabin, 2003, pp.1238–1240). We discuss related points when interpreting our results (in section 
IV). 
In section VII, we mention some concerns regarding tracking well-being with surveys 
that we do not address. We conclude by discussing possible extensions of our approach, and we 
point to a few readily actionable steps suggested by our findings. Throughout, we highlight the 
limitations of our specific implementation and point out promising directions for further 
developing the agenda we propose.  
 
I. Theoretical Framework 
We start with the standard framework for aggregating an individual’s consumption of 
different commodities. This framework underlies empirical expenditure- and income-based 
measures of well-being, including GDP; below we adapt it for conceiving a well-being index. 
We then discuss how this index-oriented framework can be viewed more generally as an 
application of choice theory, with preferences elicited via our SP survey. We use this more 
general perspective to highlight the assumptions underlying the construction and use of our 
proposed index. 
In the consumption context, an agent’s well-being is represented by a continuously-
differentiable utility function u(c). The vector, ࢉ ൌ ሺܿଵ, … , ܿெሻ′, represents the quantities of M 
market goods. Following a change in the consumption vector, ∆ࢉ, the change in utility can be 
approximated up to an arbitrary multiplicative scale as 
 
(1) ∆ݑ ൎ ൫ܦࢉݑሺࢉሻ൯′ ∙ ∆ࢉ ൌ ෍ ߲ݑሺࢉሻ߲ܿ௠
ெ
௠ୀଵ
∆ܿ௠ ∝ ෍ ݌௠
ெ
௠ୀଵ
∆ܿ௠.  
 
The proportionality follows because, at the optimum, as long as the consumer chooses a strictly 
positive amount of each good ܿ௠, each marginal utility డ௨ሺࢉሻడ௖೘  is equal to a Lagrange multiplier 
times the market price ݌௠. By fixing prices, ݌ଵതതത, … , ݌ெതതതത, at their levels in some base period and 
measuring the agent’s consumption vector over time, the government can track a quantity index 
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of real consumption, ∑ ݌௠തതതതெ௠ୀଵ ܿ௠. For small changes in ࢉ, changes in this index are 
approximately proportional to changes in utility.  
Perhaps the biggest limitation of this consumption-based approach is that it only 
considers a narrow set of determinants of well-being. To broaden its scope, we follow other 
researchers in shifting attention away from standard consumption goods (for example, rice, TVs, 
train rides) and toward more fundamental aspects of well-being (for example, health, emotional 
states, freedoms). This approach is intended to be more general in that these fundamental aspects 
include all objects of desire for individuals regardless of which specific consumption goods are 
in an agent’s choice set at a given time and place. In this framework, consumption matters for 
well-being through its effects on these more fundamental aspects of well-being, but non-
consumption determinants of well-being are also accounted for via their effects on these 
fundamental aspects.11 
Consider the utility function u(w), where ࢝ ൌ ൫ݓଵ,… , ݓ௃൯′ represents the quantities of J 
fundamental aspects. Analogously to the consumption formula above (equation 1), a change in 
utility resulting from a change in the fundamental aspects can be approximated as 
 
(2) ∆ݑ ൎ ൫ܦ࢝ݑሺ࢝ሻ൯′ ∙ ∆࢝ ൌ ෍߲ݑሺ࢝ሻ߲ݓ௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
∆ݓ௝.  
 
Instead of measuring the agent’s consumption vector c, the government would measure her 
fundamental-aspects vector w; and instead of tracking a quantity index for standard consumption 
goods, the government would track ∑ డ௨ሺ࢝ሻడ௪ണ
തതതതതതത௃
௝ୀଵ ݓ௝, with the marginal utilities fixed at a base 
period. We term ∑ డ௨ሺ࢝ሻడ௪ണ
തതതതതതത௃
௝ୀଵ ݓ௝ the agent’s well-being index. Since the marginal utilities are 
defined only up to an arbitrary multiplicative constant, so is the index. From the perspective of 
this theoretical framework, the purpose of a SWB survey is to measure the ݓ௝’s. 
 Because there are no observable prices that can be used in place of the marginal 
utilities—by which here and henceforth we mean the relative marginal utilities—the government 
																																																													
11 This perspective is essentially a variant of consumer theory in which preferences are defined over 
goods’ characteristics (Lancaster, 1966); the fundamental aspects can be thought of as the ultimate 
underlying characteristics that people care about when making choices.  
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will need direct marginal-utility estimates in order to calculate the agent’s well-being index. The 
purpose of our SP survey is to demonstrate a method for generating such estimates. We envision 
governments applying such a method on nationally representative samples and, because the 
marginal utilities may change as w changes, doing so on a regular basis (just as prices are 
currently re-measured on a regular basis). 
This description of our theoretical framework highlights the analogy between our 
proposed index and standard consumption-based indices. Our framework, however, is more 
general. Indeed, our SP survey could in principle be extended to elicit an individual’s entire 
indifference map by designing the survey to elicit stated preference between every pair of 
(explicitly and fully listed) vectors of conceivable responses to a SWB survey. Regardless of the 
shape of preferences, ordinal welfare comparisons could then be made between any of the 
individual’s SWB-survey occasions. In practice, however, such an unrestricted approach is 
unimplementable with more than a handful of aspects for two reasons. First, even if assuming 
transitivity and monotonicity eliminated the need to directly compare every pair of aspects, the 
number of pairwise comparisons required on the survey would grow exponentially with the 
number of elements in w. Second, each such pairwise comparison would require respondents to 
compare two long vectors of aspects, arguably an excessive cognitive demand on survey 
respondents. Moreover, even if the list of aspects were short, stated-preference data may be less 
reliable the farther the vectors to be compared are from the respondent’s current w because it 
may be more difficult for respondents to introspect regarding distant, unfamiliar situations.  
Our approach in this paper—and the resulting design of our SP survey detailed in section 
III below—can be understood as a more practical version of this generalized procedure, whereby 
we restrict ourselves in two ways. First, we elicit preferences only locally at the status quo, 
where we think stated-preference data are most reliable.12 Second, we assume that preferences 
can be represented by a continuously-differentiable utility function, and hence are locally linear. 
Local linearity makes the SP survey more feasible: the absence of complementarities allows us to 
alleviate respondents’ cognitive task by presenting them with a series of pairwise comparisons 
that involve a tradeoff between as few as two aspects at a time deviating from current w; and the 
																																																													
12 While our scenarios do not explicitly frame the choice as being relative to respondents’ current aspect 
levels, we believe that this is the natural interpretation (see language in the example scenario in the 
Introduction). One could more explicitly instruct respondents to interpret the choice this way by simply 
adding a few words to the scenarios’ preamble.  
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fact that the functional form of local preferences is known reduces the number of SP-survey 
questions needed to estimate the (local) indifference surface. The continuous-differentiability 
assumption underlies the discussion surrounding equation (2) above: as long as w remains within 
a small neighborhood around the w prevailing when a SP survey was conducted, the well-being 
index can be used to make welfare comparisons between SWB-survey occasions. 
Such a local welfare ordering may often be sufficient, as many individuals may have 
reasonably stable w’s for long periods of time. However, under some circumstances w may drift 
away (as time goes by) or even jump discontinuously (perhaps due to a change in policy or in 
personal circumstances). Between a w within the neighborhood where a SP survey was 
conducted and a w outside that neighborhood, the index does not provide a complete welfare 
ordering. Nonetheless, under additional assumptions on preferences, the index could provide a 
partial welfare ordering. For example, suppose that preferences are convex. Figure 1 is adapted 
from Sen (1979b) who discusses how convexity generates a partial ordering in the context of a 
real consumption index. The line AB—the tangent to the indifference curve going through ࢝଴, 
whose slope is in our case estimated with a SP survey at ࢝଴—partitions all bundles into a 
southwest set and a northeast set. Using the weights calculated from a SP survey at ࢝଴, the index 
values decrease from ࢝଴ to every aspect bundle in the southwest and increase from ࢝଴ to every 
bundle in the northeast. Thus if the index value decreases from ࢝଴ to any bundle (e.g., ࢝ଵ in the 
figure), no matter how far away, then due to convexity, we can conclude that the individual is 
worse off. If the index value increases from ࢝଴, however, the individual could be worse off (࢝ଶ 
in the figure), indifferent (࢝ଷ), or better off (࢝ସ). If a new SP survey were conducted at the new 
bundle, then it is possible that ࢝଴ would lie in the new southwest set, completing the ordering by 
revealing that the new bundle is unambiguously better than ࢝଴. It may also be possible to make a 
partial ordering more complete by applying transitivity to a sequence of unambiguous pairwise 
comparisons.  
In summary, with a given set of weights estimated at ࢝଴, our index provides a complete 
local ordering, and a partial global ordering, of w’s. Locally, increases and decreases in the index 
are both interpretable as reflecting welfare changes, while globally, comparisons require more 
involved logic such as that above. 
 Although in this paper we focus primarily on survey-based measures of the fundamental 
aspects that comprise w, our theoretical framework also applies when some or all of the aspects 
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are measured objectively. For example, some dimensions of health could be measured with 
physiological tests, and, arguably, some freedoms could be quantified. Indeed, widely-used 
indices such as the U.N.’s Human Development Index and Okun’s “misery index” (the sum of 
the inflation and the unemployment rates) consist entirely of objective measures that are 
combined by using ad hoc weights. Regardless of whether the components of w are measured 
objectively or subjectively, we propose using a data-driven method for estimating the marginal 
utilities; our SP survey is an attempt at implementing such a method. Even with objective 
measures that have observable prices, directly estimating the marginal utilities may be 
considered an alternative to making the assumptions necessary for using prices as weights. 
 While our theory above focuses on constructing a well-being index for a single agent, in 
order to construct a national index in practice, governments would need to, first, construct 
indices for many people and, second, aggregate them. To construct indices for many people, a 
method such as our SP survey could be used to estimate marginal utilities for each person in a 
representative sample. Since doing so may require a long (and hence potentially expensive) 
survey—especially if w includes many aspects—in practice pooling data within respondent 
subpopulations may sometimes be a required compromise. Given our own very limited 
resources, when demonstrating our methodology in section IV our main specification pools data 
across all respondents—something that governments should avoid, as we discuss in section VI. 
 How to aggregate utility across individuals is a central question of welfare economics and 
an active area of research in the literature on social choice. Although this paper focuses on 
constructing an individual-level well-being index, in principle our framework and empirical 
contribution are compatible with a variety of approaches to aggregation, as we briefly discuss in 
section VII. 
 
II. Aspects of Well-Being 
A major obstacle to any real-world application of our theoretical framework is that no 
one knows which fundamental aspects comprise the vector w. Indeed, different authors have 
proposed different sets of aspects as important components of well-being. Our treatment of 
aspects as arguments of utility requires that for our purposes, any proposed set must be 
exhaustive, i.e., include all arguments of preferences; and it must comprise aspects that are non-
overlapping, i.e., that are conceptually distinct. 
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Our approach in this paper is to construct as comprehensive a list of candidate 
fundamental aspects as we practically can. We additionally include what we believed would be 
broader, non-fundamental “combination aspects”—by which we mean facets of well-being that 
are not themselves fundamental but contain information regarding multiple fundamental 
aspects—which might capture more of the variation in u. Our comprehensiveness has three 
advantages. First, it reduces the risk of missing important components of w, thereby making the 
list closer to exhaustive. Second, it allows us to minimize the influence of our own ex ante 
beliefs on the set that emerges as important from our analysis.13 Third, it renders our results as 
broadly useful as possible, since different researchers can focus on the subset of our results that 
pertains to the aspects they believe comprise w—or to those they happen to have data on in an 
existing social survey. On the other hand, our attempt to be comprehensive has the drawback of 
increasing the likelihood that different aspects on our list overlap with each other. Our analysis in 
section V, in which we exclude some potentially overlapping aspects from the analysis, suggests 
that such possible overlap does not meaningfully affect our marginal utility estimates. However, 
in selecting which aspects to include in a well-being index, a method will be required for 
ensuring that fundamental aspects are not double-counted. We summarize a proposal for such a 
method in section VI; we discuss it in more detail and formalize it in the Web Appendix. 
In this section we summarize our method for compiling our master list of 136 aspects of 
well-being (see table 2 for a version of the list). The list, as well as much more detail regarding 
the process of compiling it, dividing it into different sub-lists, and creating different versions of 
it, is available in the Web Appendix.  
Our list draws from six classes of survey measures. First, we include single-question 
SWB measures, modeled after the SWB questions most commonly asked in large-scale social 
surveys (for example, those asked in or proposed for the U.K. survey discussed above). These 
include mostly measures that are considered evaluative/cognitive (e.g., life satisfaction)—i.e., 
measures based on questions that may trigger respondents to engage deliberative cognitive 
processes in order to evaluate their life—and those that are considered hedonic/affective (e.g., 
																																																													
13 That said, in compiling the list we draw exclusively on English-speaking sources, introducing a cultural 
bias—but one compatible with our respondents’. In addition, “dirty” aspects (such as racist objectives) 
are typically absent from our sources, but as we discuss in section IV, the few aspects on our list that 
could be considered “dirty” (e.g., social status) are ranked very low by our SP-survey respondents 
anyway. 
14	
	
felt happiness)—i.e., measures that are aimed at eliciting respondents’ positive or negative 
feelings. 
Second, we include measures based on items in multi-question survey measures of SWB. 
These are primarily drawn from scales commonly used in psychology, such as the PANAS 
(Positive and Negative Affect Scale).   
The third and largest class contains aspects of well-being proposed by prominent 
economists, psychologists, and philosophers that are not typically elicited on large surveys. We 
drew on proposals from the Stiglitz Commission (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009), the 
systematic compilation effort by Alkire (2002), as well as many classic sources (e.g., Maslow, 
1946; Sen, 1985; Nussbaum, 2000) and more recent contributions (Seligman and Diener, 2004; 
Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008; Graham, 2011). A complete list of the works we reviewed, 
including references by aspect, is given in the Web Appendix. The many aspects in this class 
include some that can be understood as capabilities, i.e., access to resources, choice sets, and 
freedoms. The aspects also include some that would be considered eudaimonic SWB measures 
(for example, having a meaningful life; Ryff, 1989). Such measures relate to human thriving or 
flourishing; the Greek word eudaimōn is commonly translated to mean happy in an Aristotelian 
sense, i.e., as associated with having a meaningful, valuable, or worthwhile life. 
The fourth class of measures resulted from our own introspection and discussion. Some 
of our proposed additions were confirmed to be important in our past work (Benjamin, Heffetz, 
Kimball, Rees-Jones, 2012), and others resulted from extensive discussions among ourselves and 
with colleagues. Some reflect our attempt to break down important parts of life into more 
fundamental aspects. For example, while many writers have proposed that religion is important 
for well-being, we refined “religion” into 15 aspects of well-being that may help explain the 
value of religion but that are also valued by many non-religious people (e.g., “you having people 
around you who share your values, beliefs and interests”). 
While these four classes of measures represent our attempt to include fundamental 
aspects in our list, our fifth and sixth classes serve different purposes. The fifth class represents 
our attempt to formulate combination-aspect survey questions that, if broad enough, might even 
serve as good empirical proxies for u itself, thus possibly obviating the need for an index. These 
include novel (in wording, not necessarily in concept), evaluative well-being measures, such as 
“how much you like your life” and “the overall well-being of you and your family.” 
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Finally, as a sixth class, we crafted survey versions of “objective” indicators that are 
widely-used as measures of well-being, such as the rates of GDP growth, inflation, and 
unemployment, or income inequality. The weights respondents put on such measures can serve 
as a benchmark against which we can compare measures from our first five classes.14  
After compiling an initial list, we revised it according to several criteria. To make its 
length more manageable, we combined similar items into single measures (but we preserved 
commonly-used survey questions close to their original form). To reduce subject confusion and 
response error, we oriented all items so that rating higher would conventionally be considered 
desirable; for example, “not feeling anxious.” We further edited items in order to use vocabulary 
that would be understandable by most respondents in a national sample. 
The final list of 136 aspects includes 113 “private good” aspects—relating to an 
individual’s own well-being (e.g., “your health”)—and 23 “public good” aspects (also labeled 
public-aspects)—relating to an entire society’s well-being (e.g., “equality of opportunity in your 
nation”). Among the private-good aspects, we distinguish between what we label you-aspects—
108 that pertain to the respondent but could in principle pertain to everyone (e.g., “your 
health”)—and you-only-aspects—5 that pertain to the respondent and could not meaningfully 
and distinctly pertain to everyone at the same time, for example due to their being inherently 
relative (e.g., “your social status”). 
Finally, from each of the 108 you-aspects we constructed two additional aspect versions: 
an everyone-aspect that pertains to everyone in a nation (e.g., by replacing “your health” with 
“people’s health”); and an others-aspect that pertains to typical others (e.g., “others’ health”). In 
the next section, we explain the purpose of those aspect versions and discuss them further.  
 
III. Survey Design 
																																																													
14 In principle, we could have additionally included receipt of different amounts of money as an aspect on 
our list. Doing so would have allowed us to scale the estimated marginal utilities of the non-money 
aspects, converting them to dollar units, in turn enabling one to sum equivalent variation across 
individuals. In practice, however, this approach would have significantly complicated our current 
(purposefully simplified, proof-of-concept) survey design. For example, dollar amounts would require 
their own quantitative scales that could not be made easily comparable to the rating scales of all other 
aspects without considerable design changes (see the discussion in III.C below). 
16	
	
The core of our online SP survey consists of 30 hypothetical-choice scenarios, one per 
screen. They are preceded by a screen of detailed instructions and followed by a multi-screen 
exit questionnaire.  
 
III.A. Scenario Screens 
An example scenario, as it appears on the screen, was reproduced in the Introduction. 
Each such screen has three components. First, the preamble frames the scenario as a choice 
between two options, neutrally labeled “Option 1” and “Option 2,” that have different 
consequences over the next four years. Second, the aspect table describes the difference in 
consequences between the two options. Finally, the choice question elicits a participant’s stated 
preference between the two options. 
Preamble. The preamble appears in one of two versions. The first version (reproduced in 
the Introduction) introduces personal-choice scenarios. Since much of the discourse regarding 
SWB surveys is focused on private-good aspects, personal choice seems the relevant setting for 
eliciting these aspects’ weights through respondents’ pairwise decisions that trade them off.  
The second preamble version introduces policy-vote scenarios: the opening clause 
“Imagine you are making a personal decision” is replaced with the clause “Imagine that you 
and everyone else in your nation are voting on a national policy issue.”15 Policy-vote scenarios 
have two purposes. First, as with standard public goods, our 23 public-aspects cannot typically 
be affected by one individual’s personal choice—but are routinely traded off in policy-vote 
contexts. Second, even for you-aspects, if a national SWB survey is to be used for evaluating 
policy, it may be useful to elicit the relative weights also in a setup where the aspects pertain to 
everyone (and are traded off by policy in the same way for everyone). Due to other-regarding 
preferences, for example, these everyone-weights could differ from their corresponding you-
weights elicited in personal-choice scenarios. While our empirical effort is focused on personal 
scenarios, we also explore such personal-vs.-policy comparisons below.  
																																																													
15 We chose this voting frame for two reasons. First, it is designed to imitate a situation that, while 
hypothetical, is as close as possible to the policy choice setup people have real-world experience with; 
while most people are never in a position to actually choose a policy that would get implemented, people 
often face choices over real policies in the voting booth. Second, the frame is designed to elicit 
participants’ own preferences. While these preferences might well incorporate a concern for others, we 
did not want the choices to put extra weight on others out of concern that these others would be left out of 
the decision-making process. For this reason the question explicitly states that “you and everyone else in 
your nation” are voting. 
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The rest of the preamble is identical across all scenarios. Designed to elicit participants’ 
“single-period” utility, it explicitly limits the duration of the predicted difference between the 
options. While four years is a somewhat arbitrary duration, it does not seem unreasonable as a 
time frame for assessing policy (for example, it is the length of the term of the U.S. President) as 
well as personal choices. The preamble ends with a sentence that effectively asks participants to 
imagine that anything not explicitly stated to differ is held constant. 
Aspect table. Each row of the aspect table compares the two options in terms of one 
aspect, with an “X” positioned to indicate that either Option 1 or 2 rates “much higher,” 
“somewhat higher,” or “slightly higher” on that aspect. The “about equal” column in the middle 
never contains an “X”; it serves as a reminder to participants that unlisted aspects are to be 
considered as affected equally by the two options. 
Personal scenarios draw aspects randomly from the set of 113 private aspects (which 
consists of 108 you- and 5 you-only-aspects). The policy scenarios we analyze in this paper 
instead draw aspects randomly from the set of 108 everyone- and 23 public-aspects; these 131 
aspects are effectively public goods because they affect everyone in the same way. Each 
respondent faces, in random order, 11 personal scenarios, 5 of these policy scenarios, and 14 
additional exploratory versions of policy scenarios that we do not analyze in this paper.16  
The number of aspects (or rows) in a scenario’s aspect table is randomly drawn from the 
set {2, 3, 4, 6}. While a shorter table may be easier for respondents to read and think through, a 
longer one improves statistical power for identifying marginal utilities.  
The rating of each aspect—i.e., the location of the “X” in each row—is randomly drawn 
from the six feasible ratings. However, we place two restrictions on the combination of ratings 
within a scenario. First, scenarios with an even number of aspects must be balanced: exactly half 
of the aspects favor Option 1 and exactly half favor Option 2. Second, scenarios with 4 or 6 
aspects must additionally be symmetric: each rating in favor of Option 1—i.e., “much higher,” 
“somewhat higher,” or “slightly higher”—is matched by a rating of the same intensity in favor of 
Option 2 on another aspect.17  
																																																													
16 These additional versions are designed to explore issues related to other-regarding preferences that are 
beyond the scope of this paper. (For example, to what extent do people’s votes on policy reflect their 
willingness to sacrifice their own utility for increasing others’?) These policy scenario versions draw 
aspects from sets that consist of different combinations of you-, you-only-, others-, and public-aspects. 
17 We require 2-aspect scenarios to be balanced because, otherwise, half of them are expected to elicit a 
trivial choice, as one of the options would rank higher on all aspects. By placing no restrictions on 3-
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Choice question. The choice response scale is identical across all scenarios. It is designed 
to elicit intensity of preference on a six-point scale (“Much prefer Option 1,” “Somewhat prefer 
Option 1,” “Slightly prefer Option 1,” “Slightly prefer Option 2,” etc.). To discourage “lazy” 
responses, we omitted an “indifferent” option; our “slightly” options are intended to allow for 
nearly-indifferent choices. 
 
III.B. Instructions and Questionnaire 
The instructions screen is reproduced in the Web Appendix. Respondents could re-open it 
from every scenario screen by clicking a hyperlink. It includes an example aspect table that is 
more complex than that shown in the Introduction, illustrating and explaining more possibilities. 
The instructions emphasize a number of scenario design points, including: the distinctions 
between personal-choice and policy-vote scenarios; that the two options differ only on the 
consequences listed in the aspect table; and that “The items and their rankings in the tables are 
randomly chosen by the computer so that we [the researchers] learn as much as possible from 
your choices.”18 
In addition, the instructions explain that in each row of the aspect tables, one word is 
emphasized in boldface type (in the example in the Introduction, you and your). Participants are 
asked to “pay careful attention to the emphasized words, and interpret a consequence with the 
following emphasized words as affecting the following people:”19 
																																																																																																																																																																																																				
aspect scenarios, we allow such trivial cases to occur (with 25% probability), and we use them as a 
secondary robustness check to identify respondents who might have answered at random (see footnote 29 
below). Finally, we require 4- and 6-aspect scenarios to be balanced and symmetric because our pre-tests 
suggested that otherwise, participants faced with these longer scenarios may adopt “visual shortcut” 
heuristics—such as choosing an option that ranks better on most aspects—and pay less attention to the 
identities of the aspects. We compare results estimated separately from 2-, 3-, 4-, and 6-aspect scenarios 
in section V and in the Web Appendix. 
18 This randomization disclosure is intended to prevent respondents from perceiving random combinations 
of aspects as reflecting an intentional design decision to construct a particular scenario. Such mistaken 
inferences could give rise to undesired experimenter-demand effects. 
19 We included the bolding and this “legend” (reproduced here as it appears on the screen) because pre-
tests without the bolding indicated that participants might quickly skim the aspect tables, mistakenly 
assuming that, for example, all aspects apply to only them personally. The bolding scheme allows us to 
keep the aspects short and simple and at the same time visually clear and coherent. The legend provides 
respondents with a quick reference that clarifies the bolded words’ intended meaning. 
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Once participants complete the scenarios, they fill out an exit questionnaire. We ask 
participants, in both a multiple-choice question and an open-ended question, whether they 
understood what we were asking them to do (in the multiple choice, 92.5% answered “always” 
or “mostly”; 7.5% answered “not really”).  We also ask basic demographic questions, as well as 
questions about ideology, political party affiliation, and religiosity. 
 
III.C. Design versus Theory 
As discussed above, our SP survey is intended as a first-pass demonstration of feasibility. 
As such, it is a considerably simplified version of the theory-based ideal that should guide 
governments as they design their surveys. We now briefly describe what a theoretically ideal 
survey might involve, and we highlight a few key deviations of our SP survey from that ideal. 
In an ideal application of our theory, a SP-survey component would follow a SWB-
survey component in a single, combined survey. The SWB component would elicit a 
respondent’s current aspect levels (i.e., her w). Each of the J fundamental-aspect questions would 
have its own scale: while a subjective scale with verbal labels may be a natural choice for some 
aspects, for other aspects it may be possible to use an objective scale with quantitative units. 
After respondents report their current w in the SWB-survey component, the SP component would 
elicit their choices between pairs of options, where each option involves a small change from the 
current w; these small changes would be spelled out using each aspect’s own units. With 
sufficiently many such choices, each respondent’s vector of marginal utilities could then be 
estimated. 
Our SP survey deviates from this ideal in a number of ways. First, it is a stand-alone 
survey, rather than the second component in a combined SWB+SP survey. We concentrate our 
efforts on a stand-alone SP survey since SWB surveys are already conducted routinely and do 
not require a demonstration of feasibility. Second, our survey uses verbal, relative rating scales 
that are identical for all aspects (“much,” “somewhat,” and “slightly higher”) rather than stating 
differences using each aspect’s own units. We do this to simplify and streamline the survey and 
its instructions. It also allows us to interpret relative marginal-utility estimates as informative 
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regarding aspects’ relative “importance” because the aspect ratings are put in units that are 
arguably comparable, namely respondents’ judgment of what constitutes “slightly,” “somewhat,” 
or “much” more of the aspect (but see VI.B for discussion of how, with additional data, aspects 
could be compared in terms of predictive power for the index). Third, our survey elicits few SP 
questions from each respondent, and in our marginal utility estimates below we pool the data 
across respondents. Doing so keeps the survey short—a crucial feature given our convenience 
sample—but theoretically would only be justified if respondents not only use the scales the same 
way but also have the same local slopes of indifference surfaces. We return to this last point in 
section VI.C. 
 
IV. Empirical Results: Marginal Utility Estimates 
Our SP-survey respondents were recruited during December 2011 by Clear Voice 
Research, a private firm that invites individuals to “start sharing their voice” and “make a little 
money” by participating in online surveys. We aimed at a sample that, although not a random 
sample, would resemble the adult (20+) U.S. population on the demographics listed in table 1. 
 
IV.A. Respondent Demographics 
Table 1 reports the demographic distribution of the 7,391 respondents who began our 
survey (the “All” column); the 5,397 who completed it (“Completes”); and the 4,608 included in 
our main analysis below (“Primary Sample”).20 This primary sample excludes respondents who 
completed the survey in less than eight minutes; our robustness analysis in section V below 
suggests that including them does not affect our results qualitatively but increases measurement 
error. The table shows that the three groups are similar on observables. 
The rightmost column reports figures from the 2010 American Community Survey, 2010 
Census, and 2011 Current Population Survey (see Web Appendix for details). Relative to the 
U.S. population, our respondents are more likely to be married, college-educated, and white, and 
less likely to have very high income, be Hispanic, and live alone. Our respondents may of course 
also differ on unobservables. 
																																																													
20 Due to a programming error, the first 1,936 primary-sample respondents faced scenarios in which 
aspects were unintentionally drawn from only 108 of the intended 113 personal and 131 policy aspects. 
As a result, we have more data—and tighter estimates—on some aspects. Excluding these 1,936 early 
respondents has very little effect on our main estimates (see Web Appendix table WA1). 
21	
	
 
IV.B. Personal Choices: Benchmark Specification and Results 
Our main results are reported in the “Personal” panel of table 2. Recall from section III 
that each respondent faced eleven personal scenarios where the two choice options differ on 2, 3, 
4, or 6 of the 113 personal aspects. Pooling all such scenarios across all respondents, we report 
results from the following OLS regression: 
 
(3) StatedPreferenceୱ ൌ ߙ ൅ AspectRatingsୱᇱ ∙ ࢼ ൅ ߝ௦.  
 
Each observation s captures the information from a single scenario faced by a respondent, 
corresponding to a single survey screen like the example in the Introduction. StatedPreferenceୱ 
encodes the response to the choice question. AspectRatingss, a 113-element vector, encodes the 
differences between the two options; all of its entries are 0 except for the 2–6 entries representing 
the aspects on which the options differ. We cluster standard errors at the respondent level. 
To the six points on the choice scale (“Much prefer Option 1,” etc.) we assign the six 
numerical values (-1, -0.47, -0.14, +0.14, +0.47, +1), and to the seven columns in the aspects 
table (“Option 1 much higher,” etc.) we assign the values (-1, -0.83, -0.75, 0, +0.75, +0.83, +1). 
As described in section V below, these numerical values were estimated from the data using a 
nonlinear ordered probit model, constraining the scales to be symmetric (to economize on 
parameters) and range from -1 to +1. While we prefer using these estimated scales, 
misspecifying the scales should have little effect on the estimated aspect coefficients relative to 
each other. Indeed, as reported in the Web Appendix, for the personal scenarios, the correlation 
between the coefficients reported in table 2 and those estimated with linear codings (i.e., choice 
scale: (-3, -2, -1, +1, +2, +3) and aspect ratings: (-3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3)) is 0.998. We find 
similarly high correlations (0.99) with coefficients estimated from a probit or logit model where 
we collapse the choice scale to a binary variable (prefer Option 1 vs. Option 2) and use the 
estimated scales for the aspect columns. 
Here we report OLS for maximum transparency, and for simplicity we assume for now 
that respondents are identical in both their marginal rates of substitution and their use of the 
response scale. As reported in section V below, our results are essentially unaffected when we 
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relax many of the restrictions imposed by this specification. We provide some evidence on 
heterogeneity across respondent subpopulations later in this section. 
We interpret the regression (3) as estimating equation (2), where in our empirical 
analysis, Δw is the difference in aspect ratings across the two options in a scenario. The  vector 
estimates a vector proportional to ܦ࢝ݑሺ࢝ሻ, and s captures response error. We interpret , which 
we estimate to be –0.02 (s.e. = 0.003), as picking up a very small respondent bias in favor of 
“Option 1” despite the fact that the content of the two options is randomly drawn from the same 
distribution.    
The Personal panel in the table reports, for each of the 113 aspect regressors, its 
coefficient and standard error. The “Rank” column orders the you-aspects by coefficient size (1–
108) and, additionally, places the 5 you-only-aspects relative to these by assigning to them rank 
numbers with letter suffixes (e.g., “74a” lies between 74 and 75).21 Since the independent and 
dependent variables are coded over ranges of the same length (–1 to +1), a coefficient of, for 
example, +0.46 means that on average, changing the relevant aspect from the extreme rating 
“Option 1 much higher” to the other extreme of “Option 2 much higher” causes choice to move 
46% of the entire choice scale in the same direction. 
Figure 2 summarizes the coefficient and rank information in table 2 graphically, for the 
113 personal aspects (x’s) and the 131 policy aspects (triangles; we discuss these below), sorted 
by their respective within-panel rank. Of the 113 personal aspects, all but two are positive, 
almost all statistically significantly so. This confirms that, as intended by our wording of the 
aspects, an option rating higher on an aspect is, ceteris paribus, generally considered preferable. 
(We discuss the two coefficients that are negative below.) The table and the figure show that the 
greatest variation in coefficient size across aspects occurs among those at the top (for example, 
the top 10 coefficients range from +0.46 to +0.32), and at the bottom (the bottom 10 range from 
+0.09 to –0.09); coefficients vary more slowly among middle-ranking aspects. The standard 
errors on the coefficients are typically below 0.017. These features of our estimates should be 
borne in mind when reading our discussion below, which focuses on ranks.  
																																																													
21 This ranking scheme facilitates comparing the 108 you-aspect ranks with their corresponding 108 
everyone-aspect ranks in the “Policy” panel, accommodating the fact that the you-only-aspects do not 
have counterparts in policy scenarios (and, similarly, that the public-aspects do not have counterparts in 
the “Personal” panel). 
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Looking at specific aspects, those involving family (well-being [rank 1], happiness [2], 
and relationship quality [5]); health (general [3] and mental [7]); security (financial [6], about 
life and the future [8], and physical [21]); values (morality [4] and meaning [10]); and options 
(freedom of choice [9] and resources [12]) are conspicuous in their predominance at the top of 
the table, along with—reassuringly—some measures of happiness and life satisfaction (these are 
discussed below). In contrast, at the very bottom of the table, we find all four you-only aspects 
that involve relative position—power over other people [108c], social status [108b], high relative 
income [108a], and postmortem fame [106a]—with coefficients that are either negative or close 
to zero.22 Since much evidence seems to imply a high marginal utility to status and relative 
position (see Heffetz and Frank, 2011, for a survey), we conjecture that the low ranks of these 
aspects may reflect respondents’ answering our stated-preference question in terms of their meta-
preferences or laundered preferences.23  
While as noted above we do not view the potential for meta- or laundered preference 
elicitation as necessarily a disadvantage, our estimates may also be sensitive to specific details of 
our survey design and the underlying respondent population. Later in this section, the next 
section, and the Web Appendix, we compare estimates based on alternative design details and on 
alternative subpopulations. Since our general method is held fixed, however, we can only 
speculate on its effect on our results. The deliberative frame of mind induced by our setup may 
make evaluative SWB aspects easier for respondents to consider than affective aspects; the 
double-negative framing of negative emotions may make them harder to think about than 
positive emotions; and the instruction to hold other aspects constant is almost certainly more 
difficult to follow when broader, combination aspects are varied in a scenario than when only 
narrow, fundamental aspects are varied. To the extent that our fixed design choices amplify 
estimated coefficients on some categories of aspects relative to others, comparisons of aspects 
within an aspect category may be more generalizable to alternative design choices than 
																																																													
22 The fifth you-only-aspect is non-positional: “the happiness of your friends” [74a]. At the same time, 
two of the other aspects at the bottom—“your enjoyment of winning, competing, and facing challenges” 
[108] and, to a lesser extent, a “ladder” aspect modeled after Cantril’s Self-Anchoring Scale [103]—could 
have been interpreted by respondents as involving relative position, although we did not perceive them 
that way when compiling our aspect list. Indeed, we expected the ladder aspect to rank high, along with 
other evaluative SWB measures (see IV.C below). 
23 Another possibility is that the low rank of these aspects reflects experimenter-demand effects. While we 
cannot rule out this concern, we believe it is less likely in an anonymous web-survey like ours. 
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comparisons across categories. These caveats should be borne in mind throughout our discussion 
below. 
 
IV.C. Personal Choices: Discussion 
Evaluative and affective SWB. Among happiness and life satisfaction measures, the more 
evaluative ones—family happiness24 [2] and life satisfaction [11]—are among the highest-
ranking aspects, and rank higher than the more affective ones—“how much of the time you feel 
happy” [31] and “how happy you feel” [39]. Other measures that past work has classified as 
positive affect measures, such as “how often you smile or laugh” [35] (e.g., Kahneman and 
Deaton, 2010), rank similarly to these affective happiness measures. 
Negative emotions. Recently, Deaton et al. (2011) suggest that national SWB surveys 
focus also on measuring negative emotions. In our data, the six measures they recommend (in 
their “rough order of preference”) get the following ranks: pain [49], stress [45], worry [52], 
anger [76], tired (not on our list, but we have: feeling full of energy [42] and quality of sleep 
[77]), and sad [64]. This group of measures lies in the middle of our table, with coefficients in 
the range 0.19–0.25. Other negative emotions, such as frustration [67], are also in this range. Of 
particular interest because it is the only negative emotion among the four U.K. questions from 
the Introduction, anxious [92] lies somewhat below this range; its coefficient (0.13) is roughly 
half the coefficients of stress (0.25) and pain (0.24).  
Eudaimonic SWB. While evaluative and affective measures dominate the policy discourse 
on national SWB surveys, researchers increasingly recognize the importance of eudaimonic 
dimensions of well-being. In our data, eudaimonic aspects such as being a good, moral person 
and living according to personal values [4] (coeff. 0.40) and having a life that is meaningful and 
has value [10] (coeff. 0.32) indeed rank among the highest aspects. The aspect modeled after the 
only eudaimonic question in the U.K. four—feeling that the things you do in your life are 
worthwhile [20]—has a reasonably high coefficient (0.28), yet lower than the two above. 
																																																													
24 If our respondents interpret our family happiness aspect [rank 2] as including self, then it is more 
inclusive than typical happiness measures (that refer only to self). As a result, we do not know if its place 
at the top of the table is due to it being a relatively evaluative happiness measure or to its inclusion of 
family. (We view this aspect as a relatively evaluative measure since reporting one’s family happiness is 
likely to require more evaluative effort than reporting about one’s own emotions.)  
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In summary, our agnostic, stated-preference-based approach yields high marginal utility 
estimates on measures—such as life satisfaction—that have been at the center of the discussion 
about well-being indices. At the same time, other measures that have received recent attention—
such as those of positive and negative affect, and certain eudaimonic measures—have 
coefficients that are not as high as aspects that have received less attention in this context, in 
particular, about family, health, security, values, and options. The two measures with the largest 
coefficients—“the overall well-being of you and your family” and “the happiness of your 
family”—are, as far as we know, survey questions we invented that have not previously been 
asked in large-scale surveys. Our results suggest they deserve attention in future data collection 
efforts.25 
 
IV.D. Policy Choices 
The “Policy” panel of table 2 reports estimates from a specification identical to that used 
in the Personal panel but uses data from the five policy scenarios each respondent faced. Recall 
that in such scenarios, respondents vote on policy, trading off 131 aspects that include everyone-
aspects (personal aspects that pertain to everyone in the nation) and public-aspects (public goods 
that pertain to the entire nation or, when stated, to the entire world). To make the coefficient 
magnitudes comparable across the two panels, we use the same numerical scales as in the 
personal regression (rather than re-estimating them). As mentioned above, to further facilitate 
such comparison between the you-aspects and their corresponding everyone-aspects, the “Rank” 
column ranks the everyone-aspects by coefficient size (1–108) and, in addition, places the 23 
public-aspects relative to these by assigning to them rank numbers with letter suffixes. 
Since we collected less data in these policy scenarios than in personal scenarios, standard 
errors are larger, typically in the 0.023–0.035 range. Nonetheless, the correlation between the 
108 you- and everyone-coefficient pairs is fairly high (0.81).26 Figure 3 conveys the comparison 
graphically by replicating figure 2 for only the 108 you- and 108 everyone-aspects, both sorted 
by the rank of the you-aspects in the personal scenarios. The dashed curve reports a locally-
																																																													
25 For example, to capture our overall top-ranked aspect, surveys could ask: “On a scale from 0 to 10, how 
would you rate the overall well-being of you and your family?” 
26 Here and later, we report the correlation between two vectors of estimated (sample) coefficients. Due to 
sampling error, this reported correlation is a lower bound on the correlation between the vectors of true 
(population) coefficients. 
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weighted linear regression of the everyone-coefficients (triangles). The figure suggests that on 
average, everyone-coefficients in the policy scenarios are attenuated versions of their counterpart 
you-coefficients in the personal scenarios. This may reflect respondents’ greater uncertainty 
regarding others’ preferences, perhaps causing respondents to state preferences with weaker 
intensity in policy scenarios (though remember that coefficient ratios are what matter for the 
index).  
Consistent with the high correlation, some of the high-ranking you-aspects retain their 
high rank as everyone-aspects. These include overall well-being of you and your family 
[personal rank 1; policy rank 3], health [3; 6], personal values [4; 2], and financial security [6; 8]. 
At the same time, aspects related to freedom and to avoiding abuse seem to rank higher as policy 
aspects. These include the freedom to choose [9; 1]; your ability to pursue your dreams [36; 14]; 
being treated with dignity [26; 11]; and, among double negatives, avoiding deception [23; 5], 
pain [49; 10], and emotional abuse [68; 16].  
Perhaps most importantly, several of the 23 public-aspects (included in the policy but not 
the personal scenarios) have among the largest coefficients. These include freedom from 
corruption, injustice, and abuse of power [0a] (coeff. 0.39), society helping those who struggle 
[5a], the morality of other people [5b], freedom of speech and of political participation [6a], and 
the well-being of the people in your nation [6b].27 High coefficients on freedom from corruption 
and freedom of speech seem consistent with the tendency for respondents to weight heavily, in a 
policy context, aspects that expand individuals’ choice sets—reducing the need to choose 
specific outcomes for others. We interpret these findings as providing empirical evidence that 
when making a policy choice, our respondents put high value on capabilities (Sen, 1985) and 
basic rights (Rawls, 1971). 
Finally, we discuss “objective” aspects, some of which are modeled after widely-used 
indicators. As discussed above, some of these aspects have large coefficients, including freedom 
from corruption, injustice, and abuse of power; financial security; health; and freedom of speech 
and of political participation. But among standard macroeconomic indicators, only low 
unemployment [18a] has a relatively high rank. Others have lower ranks: low inflation [43a], 
GDP growth [57a], GDP per capita [61a], and GDP [88a]. The tendency to prefer aspects that 
																																																													
27 Note that the public-aspect “the well-being of people in your nation” [6b] is quite similar to the 
everyone-aspect “the well-being of people and their families” [3]. The higher rank of the latter is 
consistent with the idea that highlighting “families” may raise the perceived importance of an aspect.  
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increase the choice set (rather than focusing exclusively on outcomes) may help explain why, 
among the “objective” aspects, the coefficient on equality of opportunity [19b] is relatively large 
(0.24), larger, for example, than that on equality of income [66a] (0.16). 
 
IV.E. Cross-Group Heterogeneity 
To provide some evidence on cross-group differences in marginal utilities, we produced 
versions of table 2 for subpopulations of our respondents. Web Appendix tables WA2–WA6 
report coefficients, respectively, for men and women; those above and below an income of 
$50,000/year; liberals, moderates and conservatives; those who do and do not attend religious 
services at least monthly; and those younger and older than 45. The tables allow for many 
comparisons and tests; here we briefly summarize only some of the main findings that emerge. 
Overall, aspects in the personal scenarios rank similarly across the subpopulations we 
examine. The sets of 113 coefficients are highly correlated across pairs of disjoint groups, with 
correlations ranging from 0.86 (liberals vs. moderates) to 0.91 (men vs. women). Moreover, 
there seems to be a broad consensus across the subpopulations that the highest-ranking aspects 
include those related to family, health, and security.  
To explore which aspects’ coefficients change most dramatically across groups, we first 
normalize our marginal utility estimates to comparable units across groups by dividing each 
group’s set of 113 coefficients by its mean (effectively treating the “average aspect” as 
numeraire); we then examine, for each aspect and each pair of disjoint groups, the ratio of the 
two normalized coefficients, dividing the smaller coefficient by the larger (so all ratios are ≤ 1). 
Tables WA2–WA6 report these ratios. We highlight here aspects that rank in the top ten in one 
group but drop sufficiently in the complementary group to yield a ratio of less than 0.8. We 
caution that not only our estimates in table 2, but also these cross-group differences, may not 
generalize to a more representative sample (cf., Heffetz and Rabin, 2012). 
Men rank higher: “your sense that your life is meaningful and has value” [men rank 5, 
women rank 29, normalized coefficient ratio (cr) = 0.77]. Women rank higher: “your mental 
health and emotional stability” [women 6, men 23, cr = 0.71]. 
High-income rank higher: life satisfaction [high income 5, low income 41, cr = 0.70], 
and having a meaningful life [high 7, low 24, cr = 0.75]. 
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Liberals rank higher: having enough time and money [liberals 4, conservatives 30, cr = 
0.78]. Conservatives rank higher:  being a good, moral person and living according to personal 
values [co. 4, li. 6, cr = 0.75], family happiness [co. 1, li. 3, cr = 0.75], and family relationships 
[co. 5, li. 9, cr = 0.77]. 
More religious rank higher: sense of purpose [more religious 9, less religious 72, cr = 
0.60], having people around you who share your values, beliefs and interests [more 10, less 60, 
cr = 0.69], feeling grateful [more 8, less 50, cr = 0.74], being good and moral [more 2, less 7, cr 
= 0.74], and making a difference and making the world a better place [more 7, less 35, cr = 
0.76]. Less religious rank higher: life satisfaction [less 9, more 36, cr = 0.77]. 
Older rank higher: having many options and possibilities in life and the freedom to 
choose among them [older 5, younger 35, cr = 0.65]. 
In policy scenarios, correlations between pairs of sets of the 131 coefficients are lower—
although still reasonably high—and range from 0.60 (liberals vs. conservatives) to 0.81 (more vs. 
less religious). Using the same method as above, all ratios are reported in tables WA2–WA6. 
Here we highlight aspects with normalized ratios below 0.6. Women rank higher: “people being 
good, moral people…” [women 1, men 35, cr = 0.50]. Men rank higher: “people getting the 
rewards and punishments they deserve” [men 5, women 75, cr = 0.58]. Liberals rank higher: the 
condition of animals, nature, and the environment [li. 1, co. 113, cr = 0.27]. Conservatives rank 
higher: “people’s ability to have and raise children” [co. 8, li. 111, cr = 0.33]. Older rank higher: 
being treated with dignity and respect [older 6, younger 76, cr = 0.53]. 
 
V. Robustness and Additional Results 
In the previous section we reported results: from (i) a simple OLS specification; 
including (ii) our entire personal and policy aspect lists; and pooling responses (iii) across 
scenarios with different numbers of aspects, (iv) across all but the speediest-to-answer 
respondents, and (v) across scenarios faced earlier and later in the survey. In this section, we 
briefly revisit these points, summarizing analyses reported in more detail in the Web Appendix. 
(i) Econometric Specification: In our OLS specification we coded the verbal scales of the 
independent and dependent variables as exogenously imposed numeric scales. These were 
estimated from the following nonlinear ordered probit specification: 
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(4) StatedPreferenceୱ∗ ൌ ൫۽ܘܜܑܗܖs∘ൣߛslightly૚ሼslightlyሽ,s ൅ ߛsomewhat૚ሼsomewhatሽ,s ൅ ૚ሼmuchሽ,s൧൯′ ∙ ࢼ ൅ ߝ௦. 
	
StatedPreferenceୱ∗ is the latent dependent variable; ۽ܘܜܑܗܖୱ, ૚ሼୱ୪୧୥୦୲୪୷ሽ,ୱ, ૚ሼୱ୭୫ୣ୵୦ୟ୲ሽ,ୱ, and  
૚ሼ୫୳ୡ୦ሽ,ୱ are vectors (whose length is the number of aspects) that jointly encode the differences 
between the two options; and ∘ is the entry-wise vector product. Each entry of ۽ܘܜܑܗܖୱ is equal 
to –1, +1, or 0, depending on whether the aspect table rates that aspect higher on Option 1, 
Option 2, or neither. The entries of ૚ሼୱ୪୧୥୦୲୪୷ሽ,ୱ, ૚ሼୱ୭୫ୣ୵୦ୟ୲ሽ,ୱ, and  ૚ሼ୫୳ୡ୦ሽ,ୱ are indicators of 
whether the aspect is rated slightly, somewhat, or much higher. We assume that ߝ௦ is normally 
distributed and use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters: ߛslightly, ߛsomewhat, the 
coefficient vector ࢼ, and the five cutpoints that link StatedPreferenceୱ∗ to the observed choice, 
StatedPreferenceୱ. Results are reported in Web Appendix table WA7.  
 Note that specification (4) normalizes “much” to be –1 or +1 depending on whether it 
favors Option 1 or Option 2, and the numerical values for “slightly” and “somewhat” used for 
the OLS specification in section IV are ߛොslightly and ߛොsomewhat. The resulting aspects-rating scale 
(i.e., the values of ߛොslightly and ߛොsomewhat) is determined by the extent to which the verbal labels 
affect choice differently, which in turn depends on a combination of three factors: (a) 
respondents’ quantitative interpretations of the verbal labels (namely, the magnitudes on the x-
axis that correspond to “slightly” and “somewhat,” given that “much” is normalized to 1); (b) 
higher derivatives of utility, averaged across the aspects (i.e., how utility on the y-axis depends 
on the x-axis magnitudes); and (c) any “focusing effect,” that is, respondents paying less 
attention to an aspect’s rating than to its direction in favor of one of the options. 
To obtain values for the choice scale in the OLS specification, we use the standard 
normal cdf to calculate the expected value of latent preference intensity conditional on observed 
preference-intensity category; linearly rescale these conditional expectations to lie in the (–1, +1) 
interval; and symmetrize them around zero by taking the average of the absolute value of each 
pair of corresponding conditional expectations. The resulting choice scale captures respondents’ 
quantitative interpretations of the verbal choice labels. 
Not surprisingly, since the numerical scales in the OLS regressions reported in section IV 
are estimated from the nonlinear ordered probit, the correlations between the 113 personal ߚ’s 
across tables 2 and WA7, as well as between the 131 policy ߚ’s across the tables, are virtually 1. 
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As an alternative, re-estimating the OLS regressions in table 2 using linear scales as described in 
section IV.B yields personal and policy coefficients (table WA8) whose correlations with those 
in table 2 are above 0.99. As a variant that allows respondents to differ in their interpretation of 
the choice intensities, we first normalize the choice scale at the respondent level by stretching the 
linear scale so that the variance across each respondent’s 30 choices is 1, and only then estimate 
the OLS (table WA8). The correlations between the coefficients estimated with and without this 
normalization are at least 0.98. For probit and logit models, see table WA9. 
(ii) Fundamental and Combination Aspects: If a combination and a fundamental aspect 
appear in the same scenario, then the presence of the combination aspect might affect 
respondents’ interpretation of the fundamental aspect. For example, if “the overall well-being of 
you and your family” is a function of “your family’s happiness,” then a respondent asked to trade 
them off might—contrary to our intention—interpret the former as meaning overall well-being 
exclusive of family happiness. Depending on the prevalence of such situations and on how 
respondents interpret them, our estimated coefficients might be biased. 
To probe the robustness of our results to this potential concern, we re-estimate our 
benchmark OLS model leaving out scenarios containing aspects that seem most likely to be 
functions of other aspects on our list. For example, for personal choices we exclude all aspects 
that we view as evaluative SWB measures—including both commonly used ones (e.g., life 
satisfaction) and our novel proposals (e.g., how desirable your life is).28 The estimated 
coefficients on the 94 remaining aspects (table WA10) are broadly similar to those reported in 
table 2 (correlation 0.99). Results are similar in other specifications, for example, excluding the 
macroeconomic indicators in policy vote scenarios (table WA11). 
(iii) Number of Aspects per Scenario: As explained in section III.A, respondents face 2-, 
3-, 4-, and 6-aspect scenarios. Re-estimating our OLS model separately for each of these four 
scenario designs, we find that the range of coefficient sizes roughly halves from 2- to 6-aspect 
scenarios. The correlations between the four sets of 113 and of 131 coefficients range from 0.84 
to 0.92 in personal and from 0.52 to 0.70 in policy scenarios (but note that the latter are more 
attenuated because the policy coefficients’ estimation errors are larger). We also examine, for 
each pair of coefficient sets, the intercept of the SD line (the line going through the mean of the 
																																																													
28 As our data and code are available on the journal’s and our websites, an interested reader can readily re-
estimate our model using her or his preferred subset of aspects. 
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sets whose slope is the ratio of standard deviations). If one set were identical to another up to a 
multiplicative scalar—i.e., the two sets implied identical marginal rates of substitution—the 
intercept would be zero. We find that the intercepts are close to zero, ranging from –0.04 to 0.15 
in personal and from –0.10 to 0.10 in policy scenarios. Our general conclusion is that while 
respondents allow each aspect to influence their stated preference less intensely per aspect when 
the number of aspects is larger, relative coefficient size remains rather stable in personal 
scenarios and somewhat stable in policy scenarios. Further details are provided in table WA12 
and in figure WA1. 
(iv) Respondents’ Effort and Comprehension: Respondents may exert little effort on 
unincentivized surveys. This may bias the estimated coefficients away from the true marginal 
utilities, for example by “compressing” aspects’ coefficients toward each other if respondents 
pay less attention to each aspect’s identity, or by biasing coefficients toward zero if respondents 
answer randomly. Using amount of time to complete the survey as a proxy for effort level, and 
re-estimating our main OLS specification separately by approximate sextiles (table WA13), we 
indeed find that the coefficients of the speediest sextile (less than 8 minutes) are severely 
attenuated relative to other sextiles’ coefficients. Outside the speediest sextile, coefficient sizes 
seem to increase with completion-time sextile less steeply and then peak at the second-slowest 
sextile (21–31 minutes). Furthermore, the correlations between the personal coefficients of the 
speediest sextile and of other sextiles range from 0.23 to 0.32, much lower than the correlations 
between pairs of other sextiles’ coefficient sets, which range from 0.76 to 0.89. For these 
reasons, our benchmark OLS specification reported in table 2 excludes respondents who took 
less than 8 minutes to complete the survey.29 Further excluding those who reported in the exit 
questionnaire that they did “not really” understand what they were asked to do (see III.B above) 
yields virtually identical estimates (table WA15). 
(v) Early vs. Late Scenarios: Responses made later in the survey may be less reliable due 
to tiredness or boredom. Alternatively, they may be more reliable due to practice. Also, 
respondents’ interpretations of particular aspects may change over the course of the survey. For 
																																																													
29 As an additional respondent-effort sensitivity check, we examine respondents who, in at least one three-
aspect scenario where one option happens to rate higher on all three aspects, choose the other option. The 
rankings of aspects in this sample are similar to our benchmark, but the coefficients are greatly attenuated 
(see table WA14). We like this sensitivity check less because it may fail to drop random responders (who 
choose the higher-rated option by chance) and, at the same time, may unduly drop respondents who prefer 
less of certain aspects.  
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example, respondents may interpret life satisfaction as a broad SWB measure early on, but as 
they face new examples of affective SWB measures, they may interpret it to exclude feelings. 
To assess these possibilities, we estimate an augmented version of our OLS specification 
by including a dummy for whether a scenario appeared in the earlier half of the survey and 
interacting it with each aspect’s rating (table WA16). We find no evidence of systematic 
differences between estimates from scenarios in earlier and later halves of the survey. 
 
VI. Pragmatics 
We now return to the two practical issues we posed in the Introduction: which questions 
should a SWB survey ask, and how should the responses be weighted? In theory, the well-being 
index formula, ∑ డ௨ሺ࢝ሻడ௪ണ
തതതതതതത௃
௝ୀଵ ݓ௝, provides clear solutions: ask about the levels of each of the J 
fundamental aspects comprising w, and weight the responses by their marginal utilities. In 
practice, as we have emphasized throughout, both our proposed list of fundamental aspects and 
our marginal-utility estimates are only first-pass proofs-of-concept in need of further 
development. 
In conjunction with making progress on those fronts, governments that wish to construct 
reliable well-being indices will have to overcome additional challenges that we have deferred 
until now. In this section we return to these challenges and outline directions for surmounting 
them.  
 
VI.A. Overlapping Questions 
In our theory in section I, preferences are defined over a vector w of fundamental aspects. 
While further progress on extending our list of survey questions may eventually result in an 
exhaustive list that includes all the components of w (as required by the theory), it would likely 
also further increase the incidence of conceptually overlapping questions (which the theory 
assumes away). Note that conceptual overlap between questions is different from empirical 
covariance (e.g., in the time series) between questions: while overlap exists when two or more 
questions refer, by the meaning of the language they use, to some of the same fundamental 
aspects (an extreme example: two questions that are perfectly synonymous), covariance between 
questions is a feature of the empirical joint distribution of aspect levels (an extreme example: 
two conceptually distinct measures A and B that are perfectly correlated, say, due to A causing 
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B). Hence non-zero covariances are likely even in the absence of overlap, and information 
regarding covariances across SWB survey waves (or across respondents) is not sufficient for 
identifying overlap. 
Intuitively, including overlapping questions in the well-being index would lead to double-
counting, a problem analogous to counting some components of GDP more than once. Hence, 
before a reliable well-being index can be constructed, a strategy is needed for avoiding double-
counting. One such strategy is to find a list of SWB questions free from overlap by eliminating 
questions that overlap with other questions on the list. Doing so requires a method for detecting 
overlap between any given pair of SWB survey questions. This subsection briefly outlines the 
basic idea underlying one such method; we provide an extended discussion, a fully specified 
concrete example, and a formal treatment in the Web Appendix. 
The idea behind our overlap-detection method is to use a variation on our SP survey in 
order to compare the (relative) marginal utility of the joint increase in two survey questions 
(appearing within a single scenario option) with the sum of the (relative) marginal utilities of the 
separate increases of the two survey questions (appearing in two separate scenarios). For 
example, consider two of the U.K. questions from the Introduction: life satisfaction and life 
worthwhileness. If the two questions do not overlap—that is, if they elicit two fundamental 
aspects or, more generally, two functions of disjoint sets of fundamental aspects—then the sum 
of the marginal utility of life satisfaction plus the marginal utility of life worthwhileness (both 
relative, say, to the marginal utility of health) would equal the (relative to health) marginal utility 
of a joint increase in life satisfaction and life worthwhileness. This equality holds approximately 
even if the aspects measured by the two questions enter preferences as complements, as long as 
the increases are small. On the other hand, if the two questions do overlap, then the marginal 
utility of their joint increase would be smaller than the sum of marginal utilities of their separate 
increases because part of the joint increase is overlapping and is taken into account by survey 
respondents only once.  
Therefore, to identify overlap between, e.g., life satisfaction and life worthwhileness, in 
the Web Appendix we propose to measure these (relative) marginal utilities by collecting data 
from (a) two-aspect scenarios where respondents choose between different increases in life 
satisfaction in Option 1 versus increases in a third aspect in Option 2; (b) two-aspect scenarios 
where respondents choose between different increases in life worthwhileness in Option 1 versus 
34	
	
increases in that third aspect in Option 2; and (c) three-aspect scenarios where respondents 
choose between different increases in life satisfaction and life worthwhileness in Option 1 versus 
increases in that third aspect in Option 2. Such a data collection effort would effectively replicate 
our own SP survey, with three main differences: first, it would target pairs of questions where 
overlap is suspected; second, it would involve only the relevant two- and three-aspect scenarios 
described in (a), (b), and (c) above; and third, it would adjust and refine the language in the 
scenarios’ preamble to encourage respondents to interpret joint increases in pairs of questions in 
specific ways, a point that we briefly discuss now.  
While our SP-survey instructions may be sufficient when the SWB survey questions 
under study are fundamental aspects, the formal theory we develop in the Web Appendix 
highlights the importance of respondents’ interpretation of the implied changes in fundamental 
aspects when the questions under study are not themselves one-to-one measures of fundamental 
aspects. We present two propositions, relying on two alternative sets of assumptions regarding 
respondents’ interpretations, each of which formally substantiates the validity of our overlap-
detection method. However, as we discuss in the Web Appendix, developing the survey language 
that would encourage respondents to interpret scenarios in one of the ways required by our 
theory would necessitate a process of developing and testing survey instructions that goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, our appendix treatment suggests that the problem 
of potential question overlap can be analyzed formally and addressed practically, and takes some 
tentative steps in those directions. 
 
VI.B. Abridged Index 
From a pragmatic point of view, identifying a sub-list of survey questions that avoids 
overlap (while fully covering the fundamental aspects in w) has an additional important 
consequence: it shortens the list of questions to elicit. In what follows, we use the term “full 
index” to refer to the well-being index that is based on such a shorter yet complete list, which we 
assume consists of exactly J fundamental-aspect questions.30 Such a list may still however be 
																																																													
30 With J fundamental aspects in w, a complete no-overlap list has at most J questions: exactly J if they 
are all fundamental-aspect questions, or fewer if some are “composite-aspect” questions, meaning that 
they elicit non-fundamental aspects that are subutility functions (see the Web Appendix for a formal 
definition and discussion). Such composite aspects can be substituted in the theory and in the index for 
their underlying fundamental aspects. 
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longer than the list of questions a governments is able (or willing) to regularly include on each 
wave of its SWB survey. It may hence be important to also consider the two practical questions 
from the Introduction with an added constraint: which items should a government include on a 
SWB survey that is limited to only ܰ ൏ ܬ questions? And, conditional on asking N questions (not 
necessarily the optimal ones), how should the responses be weighted? 
Conditional on a SWB survey eliciting responses ሼݎଵ, ݎଶ, … , ݎேሽ to a given set of N 
questions, a natural weighting approach is to seek weights, ߙଵ, ߙଶ, … , ߙே, such that the “abridged 
index” ∑ ߙ௡ݎ௡ே௡ୀଵ  is the best predictor of the full index in an R2 sense. The optimal weights will 
generally no longer be proportional to the estimated marginal utilities because included questions 
will proxy for excluded aspects with which they covary in the time series.31 If, in addition, the N 
questions can be selected, then a natural selection approach is to select those that, weighted 
optimally, best predict the time series of the full index. (Combination-aspect questions that have 
been excluded from the full index due to overlap may be especially useful in this context.) Note 
that the optimal set of N questions may not necessarily include the questions with the largest 
marginal-utility estimates. For example, Deaton et al. (2011) argue that negative emotions 
(whose coefficients we report in IV.C above as ranking only in the middle of our table 2) are 
important to include on a government’s SWB survey due to their relatively high variance and 
low covariance with other questions.  
To construct an N-question abridged index that is optimal in the above sense of best-
predicting the full index, it would be necessary to first construct and track the full index, at least 
for a few survey waves. In the theoretically ideal world of an infinite sample and unlimited 
computing power, the optimal abridged index would be found by regressing the full index on all 
possible sets of N questions, finding the set that maximizes R2. In practice, with a finite sample, 
more sophisticated methods are needed to avoid overfitting in both selection of questions and 
estimation of their coefficients. Miller (2002) provides a comprehensive discussion of such 
methods. 
Two additional points regarding an abridged index are worth mentioning. First, different 
abridged indices may be optimal for different intended uses of the index. For example, if the 
abridged index is used mainly to track individuals’ well-being over time, then the objective 
																																																													
31 Note that variants of our SP survey (including those referred to in VI.A) are not informative regarding 
covariances because the SP survey exogenously varies the aspect bundles to be compared in a way 
unrelated to time-series covariances of responses to the SWB survey. 
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function to best-predict is a time-series of the full index (as proposed above). Alternatively, if the 
index is used to guide policy, then question selection and weighting should account for the fact 
that some aspects may vary a great deal but be relatively immune to policy, while others may 
move little unless changed by policy (for example, Deaton et al. (2011) argue that stress may be 
particularly sensitive to policy).  
Second, if the questions’ variance-covariance matrix shifts over time, then an abridged 
index’s optimal questions and weights may change even when the intended use is held fixed and 
even if the marginal utilities have not changed. This point is related to the well-known Lucas 
critique from macroeconomics; even if the underlying structural model is fixed, the best-fitting 
reduced-form equation may be unstable as circumstances shift. For this reason, the full index 
should be tracked at least periodically—e.g., by switching back, every few survey waves, from 
the abridged survey to the full survey—and the optimal abridged index should be periodically re-
estimated. 
 
VI.C. Pooling Respondents 
While abridged indices would reduce the number of questions to ask on regular SWB-
survey waves, our discussion above makes it clear that at least periodically, it is crucial to 
construct the full index. Hence, at least periodically, the full list of SWB questions and a full set 
of marginal-utility estimates would be needed. Even if the full list of SWB questions is not by 
itself considered too long to ask on a single SWB survey, multiple SP-survey questions are 
required for estimating each marginal utility, and therefore estimating the full set of marginal 
utilities may require a long survey. While breaking a long survey into shorter modules 
administered to the same respondent on successive occasions may be feasible, a government 
might wish to divide the full set of required SP questions across different respondents and pool 
their responses. Under what conditions would doing so be justified? 
Our theory in section I is restricted to an individual agent. Estimating marginal utilities 
from pooled data is therefore theoretically justified only when the pooled respondents’ 
indifference surfaces have the same local slope. We refer to such respondents as being of the 
same “type.”32 In practice, while it is unlikely that any two respondents are of exactly the same 
																																																													
32 Thus, even if two respondents have the same preferences, if their interpretation and reporting of their 
w’s differ in a way that leads to indifference surfaces with different local slopes, then the respondents 
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type, it may be possible to partition a population of respondents into approximate types. To do 
so, one would need to conduct a full SP survey (long enough for identifying each respondent’s 
local marginal utilities) on at least a subsample of respondents. One could then search for 
observables (such as sex, age, etc.) that may characterize types.  
In our own main specification in section IV, we pooled data across all of our respondents, 
effectively treating them all as a single type. Doing so is difficult to justify theoretically, and as 
discussed above governments should not—and would not have to—do so. That said, to the extent 
that some of our estimates by several different demographic groups (reported in the Web 
Appendix and summarized in IV.E) are viewed as not that different from each other, it is 
possible that, as an empirical matter, pooling may yield sensible estimates. 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
Our current system of national accounts has been continually refined over many decades, 
and continues to be revised. Converging on how well-being should be tracked is likely to be 
similarly arduous. Much work has already been done. But that work, and our own 
contributions—the theory and methodology, aspect list, and marginal-utility estimates—are only 
a bare beginning. We address only a fraction of the issues in constructing well-being indices that 
we are aware of, and there are surely many other issues we have not thought of. 
Perhaps the most urgent unresolved theoretical issue is aggregation across individuals. 
This issue is not specific to our approach. As a workaround, researchers (say, using aggregate 
consumption or GDP as a welfare measure) often take the leap of assuming a representative 
agent. If one were willing to assume a representative agent, a national well-being index could be 
constructed from marginal-utility estimates like ours, together with average responses to a SWB 
survey. Alternatively, including money in the SP survey as if it were an “aspect” would enable 
scaling the marginal utilities in dollar units (see footnote 14). The change in the well-being index 
could then be measured in dollars for each respondent and summed across respondents. As 
another alternative, the same procedure could be followed with some other numeraire good; for 
example, time might be an attractive numeraire. Other recent proposals regarding aggregation in 
																																																																																																																																																																																																				
should be considered of different types. On the other hand, even if two respondents interpret an aspect 
differently—for example, “being a good, moral person” could involve different behaviors that satisfy 
different moral values for different people—the two are still of the same type as long as that aspect’s 
relative marginal utility is the same at their current fundamental-aspect levels. 
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the context of SWB surveys include Fleurbaey, Schokkaert, and Decancq (2009), Fleurbaey and 
Maniquet (2011), and Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Szembrot (2013). 
 Another set of concerns, emphasized by Frey and Stutzer (2007, 2012), hereafter FS, is 
that if aggregated SWB responses were regularly used for policymaking, both governments and 
individuals might have an incentive to manipulate the survey-based index for their own benefit. 
One concern FS raise is that politicians and public officials have many degrees of freedom that 
they may exploit when selecting questions, weights, and the respondent population used for 
constructing an index. As FS observe, similar concerns also arise with traditional indicators such 
as GDP and the rate of unemployment. We believe that—as with these traditional and widely-
used indicators—having standardized procedures for constructing the index, such as the 
procedures developed in this paper, can eliminate many of these degrees of freedom. Another 
concern FS raise is that individuals may have an incentive to deviate from truthfully responding 
to the SWB survey. While we are not aware of evidence of such conscious attempts by 
individuals or interest groups to manipulate existing survey-based indicators such as the rate of 
unemployment, we explore in a companion paper (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, and Szembrot, 
2013) a mechanism for aggregating SWB responses and guiding policy that reduces incentives 
for non-truthful responding. 
Yet another set of concerns relates to measurement. While we have assumed throughout 
that aspects of well-being can be meaningfully measured with a SWB survey, such measurement 
still faces major challenges that we have not addressed. For example, traditional SWB measures 
may be over-sensitive to immediate context, under-sensitive to lasting changes in life 
circumstances, and subject to recalibration of the response scale (see Adler, 2012, for a 
comprehensive critical review of these and other challenges). And of course all survey measures 
are subject to measurement error. 
We have focused on constructing a well-being index based on combining a SWB survey 
with a SP survey. But the framework and method we have developed could be applied in three 
additional directions. First, as mentioned above, one could use a SP survey to obtain weights for 
existing indices of objective measures, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), that 
currently use ad hoc weights. In that case, the objective measures—for the HDI: longevity, 
education, and GDP per capita—would replace the aspects in the SP survey. 
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Second, one could extend market-price-based indices, such as GDP, to incorporate other 
factors using “price” imputations. Rather than a function of fundamental aspects, utility would be 
modeled as a function of market goods as well as non-market goods such as leisure, social 
relationships, and the environment. These goods would replace the aspects in the SP survey. 
Third, while our SP survey and analysis are based on the assumption that respondents’ 
stated preferences can be used to assess welfare—an approach we find attractive on liberalist 
grounds—our methodology could be adapted to accommodate alternative assumptions. For 
example, if one assumed that life satisfaction equaled welfare, then one would replace our stated 
choice question with a predicted-life-satisfaction question. Alternatively, one might replace 
“you” with “someone like you” in the stated-choice question if one believed that the latter would 
yield more reliable responses. 
 While we view this paper primarily as proposing a long-term agenda, our findings also 
point to a few readily actionable steps. First, our results suggest prioritizing the measurement of 
aspects related to family, health, and security; eudaimonic and especially evaluative SWB 
measures; and, especially in the policy context, freedoms and capabilities. Second, as discussed 
in section VI, for the purpose of selecting specific questions for regular inclusion on SWB 
surveys, we highlight the value of gathering data on as many aspects as possible—at least 
initially (cf. Deaton et al., 2011) and at regular intervals. Third, along with conducting SWB 
surveys, we call for governments and researchers to devote resources to estimating aspects’ 
marginal utilities; our SP survey illustrates one method for doing so. 
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Table 1.  Respondent Demographics 
  
 
All 
(N = 7391) 
 
Completes 
(N = 5397) 
Primary 
Sample 
(N = 4608) 
 
Census 
Etc. 
Marital Status 
Married 59.3 58.9 59.8 48.8 
Never Married 24.3 25.5 23.4 32.1 
Other 16.4 15.6 16.8 19.1 
Highest 
Education 
Level 
Completed 
High School Grad 23.2 21.9 21.4 42.9 
Some College 40.7 39.8 41.0 28.9 
Bachelor's Degree 24.3 25.4 25.5 17.7 
Graduate Degree 11.5 12.7 12.0 10.4 
Age 
20-29 19.7 21.1 18.0 18.9 
30-39 18.3 19.5 18.4 17.8 
40-49 19.3 20.0 20.0 19.3 
50-64 20.8 20.4 22.0 26.1 
65 and older 21.9 19.0 21.5 17.9 
Income 
less than $20,000 17.9 18.1 17.4 19.8 
$20,000-39,999 27.9 27.0 27.9 21.7 
$40,000-49,999 10.9 10.2 10.8 8.9 
$50,000-74,999 19.8 20.0 20.5 17.7 
$75,000-99,999 11.3 11.7 11.6 11.4 
$100,000 and above 12.1 13.0 11.8 20.4 
Region 
Midwest 23.0 23.2 24.3 21.7 
Northeast 19.8 20.0 19.3 17.9 
South 34.0 33.4 33.8 37.1 
West 23.2 23.4 22.6 23.3 
Race 
White 76.6 75.2 78.2 63.7 
Black 9.8 10.1 9.6 12.2 
Hispanic/Latino 7.7 8.2 6.4 15.4 
Asian 3.7 4.2 3.5 4.7 
Other 2.2 2.2 2.2 4.0 
Household 
Size 
1 18.0 17.7 18.2 26.7 
2 35.2 33.8 35.1 32.8 
3 18.8 19.1 18.6 16.1 
4 and above 27.8 29.2 27.9 24.4 
Employment 
Status 
Employed 53.7 55.9 53.3 57.4 
Unemployed 8.6 8.7 8.8 6.9 
Not in labor force 37.6 35.4 37.8 35.6 
Notes: All numbers are percentages. “All”: respondents who began the survey. “Completes”: respondents who 
completed all scenarios. “Primary Sample”: respondents who took at least 8 minutes to complete the survey. 
Sources: Authors’ survey, 2010 American Community Survey, 2010 Census, 2011 Current Population Survey. 
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Table 2.  Relative Marginal Utility Estimates 
 Personal Policy 
Aspect Coef. S.E. Rank Coef. S.E. Rank 
freedom from corruption, injustice, and abuse of power in your 
nation    0.39 0.026 0a 
the overall well-being of you and your family 0.46 0.016 1 0.33 0.033 3 
the happiness of your family 0.43 0.017 2 0.24 0.024 21 
your health 0.42 0.017 3 0.29 0.025 6 
you being a good, moral person and living according to your 
personal values 0.40 0.017 4 0.35 0.025 2 
the quality of your family relationships 0.37 0.017 5 0.25 0.024 13 
society helping the poor and others who struggle    0.30 0.024 5a 
the morality, ethics, and goodness of other people in your nation    0.29 0.024 5b 
your financial security 0.34 0.017 6 0.28 0.023 8 
freedom of speech and people’s ability to take part in the political 
process and community life    0.29 0.025 6a 
the well-being of the people in your nation    0.29 0.024 6b 
your mental health and emotional stability 0.34 0.016 7 0.25 0.025 15 
your sense of security about life and the future in general 0.33 0.016 8 0.26 0.024 12 
you having many options and possibilities in your life and the 
freedom to choose among them 0.32 0.017 9 0.35 0.034 1 
the amount of freedom in society    0.27 0.025 9a 
your sense that your life is meaningful and has value 0.32 0.017 10 0.27 0.023 9 
how satisfied you are with your life 0.31 0.017 11 0.18 0.033 53 
you feeling that you have enough time and money for the things 
that are most important to you 0.30 0.017 12 0.21 0.023 32 
how much you like your life 0.30 0.017 13 0.19 0.031 46 
how peaceful, calm, and harmonious your life is 0.29 0.017 14 0.24 0.024 18 
your nation being a just society    0.25 0.023 14a 
your feeling of independence and self-sufficiency 0.29 0.016 15 0.23 0.024 25 
your pride and respect for yourself 0.29 0.017 16 0.19 0.024 44 
your sense that you are standing up for what you believe in 0.29 0.017 17 0.21 0.025 33 
your sense that you are making a difference, actively contributing 
to the well-being of other people, and making the world a better 
place 0.29 0.017 18 0.32 0.025 4 
how low the rate of unemployment is in your nation    0.24 0.024 18a 
how much you enjoy your life 0.29 0.016 19 0.24 0.025 17 
trust among the people in your nation    0.24 0.023 19a 
equality of opportunity in your nation    0.24 0.023 19b 
the extent to which you feel the things you do in your life are 
worthwhile 0.28 0.016 20 0.24 0.032 23 
your physical safety and security 0.28 0.016 21 0.24 0.023 22 
the well-being of the people in the world    0.24 0.024 21a 
you “being the person you want to be” 0.28 0.017 22 0.17 0.024 62 
your freedom from being lied to, deceived, or betrayed 0.28 0.017 23 0.30 0.026 5 
people getting the rewards and punishments they deserve    0.23 0.025 23a 
you having people you can turn to in time of need 0.28 0.016 24 0.28 0.024 7 
the extent to which you "have a good life" 0.28 0.016 25 0.24 0.032 19 
the condition of animals, nature, and the environment in the world    0.22 0.026 25a 
you having the people around you think well of you and treat you 
with dignity and respect 0.27 0.017 26 0.26 0.023 11 
how grateful you feel for the things in your life 0.27 0.017 27 0.22 0.032 26 
your sense of control over your life 0.27 0.017 28 0.24 0.023 20 
how much love there is in your life 0.27 0.016 29 0.20 0.025 42 
how much you appreciate your life 0.27 0.016 30 0.18 0.033 58 
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 Personal Policy 
Aspect Coef. S.E. Rank Coef. S.E. Rank 
how much of the time you feel happy 0.27 0.017 31 0.20 0.025 41 
your sense that things are getting better and better 0.27 0.016 32 0.19 0.032 49 
your sense that you know what to do when you face choices in 
your life 0.26 0.016 33 0.18 0.023 55 
the extent to which humanity does things worthy of pride    0.21 0.024 33a 
you having people around you who share your values, beliefs and 
interests 0.26 0.016 34 0.21 0.024 29 
how often you smile or laugh 0.26 0.017 35 0.14 0.024 82 
your ability to dream and pursue your dreams 0.26 0.016 36 0.25 0.024 14 
your chance to live a long life 0.26 0.016 37 0.19 0.025 45 
the amount of love in the world    0.20 0.025 37a 
how fulfilling your life is 0.26 0.017 38 0.15 0.037 78 
how happy you feel 0.26 0.016 39 0.23 0.034 24 
how glad you are to have the life you have rather than a different 
life 0.25 0.016 40 0.15 0.034 73 
your passion and enthusiasm about things in your life 0.25 0.016 41 0.15 0.024 77 
you feeling alive and full of energy 0.25 0.016 42 0.15 0.023 76 
your ability to fulfill your potential 0.25 0.016 43 0.21 0.022 28 
how low the rate of inflation is in your nation’s economy    0.19 0.024 43a 
your ability to be yourself and express yourself 0.25 0.016 44 0.19 0.023 47 
the absence of stress in your life 0.25 0.017 45 0.15 0.024 74 
your ability to keep good perspective in your life 0.25 0.017 46 0.18 0.025 57 
your sense of purpose 0.25 0.017 47 0.21 0.023 35 
the amount of order and stability in your life 0.24 0.016 48 0.18 0.023 56 
your freedom from pain 0.24 0.017 49 0.26 0.022 10 
you feeling that things are going well for you 0.24 0.016 50 0.21 0.035 34 
the quality of your romantic relationships, marriage, love life or 
sex life 0.24 0.017 51 0.16 0.026 69 
the absence of worry in your life 0.23 0.016 52 0.20 0.024 38 
your sense that you are competent and capable in the activities 
that matter to you 0.23 0.017 53 0.20 0.024 39 
your physical comfort 0.23 0.015 54 0.12 0.023 88 
the amount of order and stability in society    0.18 0.025 54a 
how full of beautiful memories your life is 0.23 0.016 55 0.11 0.032 90 
your success at accomplishing your goals 0.23 0.017 56 0.21 0.023 36 
your ability to shape and influence the things around you 0.23 0.016 57 0.19 0.024 50 
the rate of economic growth (GDP growth) over time in your 
nation    0.18 0.026 57a 
you feeling that your life has direction 0.22 0.017 58 0.16 0.023 67 
how rewarding the activities in your life are 0.22 0.016 59 0.16 0.034 68 
you getting the things you want out of life 0.22 0.017 60 0.15 0.033 79 
your sense of optimism about your future 0.22 0.016 61 0.22 0.034 27 
the average income of people in your nation (GDP per capita)    0.17 0.024 61a 
you feeling that you have been fortunate in your life 0.22 0.016 62 0.18 0.033 54 
the extent to which your nation does things worthy of pride    0.17 0.024 62a 
your knowledge, skills, and access to information 0.22 0.016 63 0.21 0.023 31 
the absence of sadness in your life 0.22 0.017 64 0.20 0.024 37 
how often you can feel relaxed instead of feeling your life is 
hectic 0.22 0.016 65 0.13 0.023 85 
your sense of achievement and excellence 0.21 0.016 66 0.16 0.025 65 
equality of income in your nation    0.16 0.024 66a 
the absence of frustration in your life 0.21 0.016 67 0.17 0.025 61 
your freedom from emotional abuse or harassment 0.20 0.017 68 0.25 0.025 16 
you not feeling depressed 0.20 0.016 69 0.15 0.025 80 
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 Personal Policy 
Aspect Coef. S.E. Rank Coef. S.E. Rank 
your ability to have and raise children 0.20 0.017 70 0.18 0.024 59 
you feeling that you are part of something bigger than yourself 0.20 0.016 71 0.17 0.024 60 
you having many moments in your life when you feel inspired 0.20 0.016 72 0.15 0.025 71 
the amount of pleasure in your life 0.20 0.017 73 0.19 0.024 43 
your personal growth 0.19 0.016 74 0.14 0.024 81 
the happiness of your friends 0.19 0.024 74a    
how often you are able to challenge your mind in a productive or 
enjoyable way 0.19 0.016 75 0.15 0.024 75 
the absence of anger in your life 0.19 0.017 76 0.19 0.025 51 
the quality of your sleep 0.19 0.016 77 0.09 0.025 96 
you feeling that you understand the world and the things going on 
around you 0.19 0.016 78 0.15 0.025 70 
your sense that everything happens for a reason 0.18 0.016 79 0.09 0.024 95 
the absence of fear in your life 0.18 0.017 80 0.20 0.026 40 
how easy and free of annoyances your life is 0.17 0.016 81 0.07 0.025 98 
how desirable your life is 0.17 0.016 82 0.09 0.035 97 
your ability to fully experience the entire range of healthy human 
emotions 0.17 0.016 83 0.19 0.024 48 
your ability to use your imagination and be creative 0.17 0.017 84 0.16 0.023 66 
your sense of discovery and wonder 0.16 0.016 85 0.11 0.024 91 
freedom of conscience and belief in your nation    0.13 0.024 85a 
how close your life is to being ideal 0.16 0.017 86 0.12 0.032 87 
your sense of community, belonging, and connection with other 
people 0.16 0.017 87 0.21 0.024 30 
you not being lonely 0.15 0.016 88 0.17 0.024 64 
the total size of your nation's economy (GDP)    0.12 0.024 88a 
you feeling that you are understood 0.15 0.017 89 0.19 0.024 52 
your absence of internal conflict (conflict within yourself) 0.15 0.016 90 0.15 0.024 72 
the absence of regret you feel about your life 0.14 0.016 91 0.02 0.033 105 
you not feeling anxious 0.13 0.017 92 0.09 0.024 94 
how interesting, fascinating, and free of boredom your life is 0.13 0.016 93 0.03 0.023 103 
you having new things, adventure, and excitement in your life 0.12 0.016 94 0.13 0.024 86 
the amount of fun and play in your life 0.12 0.016 95 0.11 0.024 89 
your sense of connection with the universe or the power behind 
the universe 0.12 0.017 96 0.10 0.025 93 
how much beauty you experience in your life 0.11 0.017 97 0.04 0.025 101 
your material standard of living 0.11 0.016 98 0.06 0.026 100 
the overall quality of your experience at work 0.10 0.017 99 0.14 0.023 83 
you having a role to play in society 0.10 0.016 100 0.17 0.024 63 
your opportunities to participate in ceremonies, cultural events, 
and celebrations that are meaningful to you 0.09 0.016 101 0.11 0.024 92 
how often you become deeply engaged in your daily activities (so 
deeply engaged that you lose track of time) 0.09 0.017 102 0.01 0.023 106 
your rating of your life on a ladder where the lowest rung is 
“worst possible life for you” and the highest rung is “best possible 
life for you” 0.09 0.016 103 0.04 0.030 102 
the absence of shame and guilt in your life 0.07 0.016 104 0.00 0.025 107 
you having a beautiful life story, or a life that is "like a work of 
art" 0.07 0.016 105 0.13 0.034 84 
the absence of humiliation and embarrassment in your life 0.07 0.016 106 0.07 0.025 99 
you having others remember you and your accomplishments long 
after your death  0.04 0.022 106a    
your ability to "be in the moment" 0.04 0.017 107 -0.02 0.023 108 
your enjoyment of winning, competing, and facing challenges 0.04 0.016 108 0.02 0.024 104 
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 Personal Policy 
Aspect Coef. S.E. Rank Coef. S.E. Rank 
how high your income is compared to the income of other people 
around you 0.03 0.022 108a    
your social status -0.06 0.022 108b    
your power over other people -0.09 0.022 108c    
Notes: Personal panel: OLS regression of stated preference on 113 personal aspects and a constant (const. = –0.02, 
s.e. = 0.003), using personal choice scenarios (N = 50,688). Policy panel: OLS regression of stated preference on the 
131 policy aspects and a constant (const. = –0.01, s.e. = 0.004) using the policy vote scenarios (N = 23,040). 
Standard errors clustered at the respondent level. For the 108 aspects that have versions that appear in both types of 
scenarios, the text used in the personal choice scenarios is shown; in policy choice scenarios, “people” and 
“people’s” replace “you and “your.” For each scenario type, the numbers 1–108 are used to rank, by coefficient size, 
aspects that appear in both scenario types. An aspect that appears in one scenario type receives a rank with a letter: 
5a, for example, indicates that the coefficient was between the aspects ranked 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Partial Welfare Ordering from Non-Local Changes in the Well-Being Index 
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Figure 2.  Relative Marginal Utility Estimates 
 
Notes: Aspect coefficients by rank, from benchmark OLS regressions (table 2), separately for 113 personal-scenario 
aspects (x’s) and 131 policy-scenario aspects (triangles). 
 
Figure 3.  Relative Marginal Utility Estimates: 108 you- and everyone-aspects 
 
Notes: Aspect coefficients from benchmark OLS regressions (table 2) for the 108 you-aspects (from personal 
scenarios, x’s) and their corresponding 108 everyone-aspects (from policy scenarios, triangles), by rank in the 
personal scenarios. Dashed curve: local linear regression of everyone-coefficients (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth 
= 6). 
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